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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
Case No.
ANASTACIO GALLEGOS, aka
TED GALLEGOS, and
JUAN RALLES GALLEGOS, aka
RAY GALLEGOS,

10109

Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal from Convictions of the District· court of Sa1t Lake
County, Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a criminal action. The brother Appellants were
charged jointly with Murder In the First Degree (76-30-3,
U.C.A., 1953).
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury of 12 men: in the District
Court of Salt Lake County. Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr.
presided.
The Appellants were convicted of the included offense
of Murder In the Second Degree (76-30-3, U.C.A., 1953) and
appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek reversal of the judgments and
dissmal of the informations, or, that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about the hour of 12:30 a.m., August 11, 1963, on
the sidewalk near the Annex Bar, 666 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, Raul Yanes was killed as a result of
having been stabbed.
Mike Hoopiiana was the sole eye witness to testify to
the scuffle (T. 182) which resulted in death. He testified
that he thought (T. 181) it was the Appellant, Juan Ralles
Gallegos, hereinafter to be referred to as Ray, who held
him at knife point to stay out (T. 181) of the scuffle (T.
181) around the corner (T. 190) between Yanes and whom
he thought (T. 183) to be the Appellant Auastacio Gallegos, hereinafter to be referred to as Ted.
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Hoopiiana testified that he didn't see how the scuffle
started (T. 190) but that towards the end of it he thought
(uot too sure: T. 183) it was Ted who stabbed Yanes
in the heart (T. 182) three times (T. 184) and Ray
\\'ho stabbed him in the back (T. 204), from 4-6 feet away
(T. 182). from a distance beyond where his arms could extend (T. 188), while 2 or 3 other idle possessors of knives
stood as closely by as himself (T. 188) but did nothing (T.
184) and were not identified by him (T. 189), although the
same circumstances and powers of perception were presently available in equal proportion for him to observe the
others as well as Appellants.) (T. 189) Actually Yanes had
but 2 tvounds, with none in the back. Hoopiiana \Vas confused and dru,nk ('I'. 191); took but one glance (T. 189);
saw no faces (T. 183), no marks of identity (T. 189), etc.,
as is to be noted in more detail in discusion of Point II.
The state relied on a Dick Je~ome being with the Appellants that night (T. 111). Hoopiiana knows him (T. 189)
but gave no identifying testimony of his being present. If
he had been there he would have seen him (T. 189).
Jerome~

y·anes and both Appellants are Mexicans;
Hoopiiana is Hawaiian; and all had been to some of the
same bars (El Prado, etc.); but Appellants were steadily
employed (Ray at Hill Air Froce Base and Ted a barber)
\vhile Hoopi~ana was an unemployed felon on parole and
Yanes on welfare.
Hoopiana testified that he entered the Annex Bar after
Yanes was stabbed (T. 184) to get his mind straight
(T. 204) before walking away from his positively dead
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friend (T. 204) on his way to the Blackhawk Lounge to
establish his alibi (T. 192)

Hoopiiana, though unemployed, (T. 186), still had a
valuable friend in his dedicated lawyer who has served
him so well, for so long, for so little. He called
him Sunday evening )almost 24 hours after Yanes
\va.:; killed) and \Vas advised he could be charged with murder (ri'. 196). At that time Hoopiiana did not tell his lawyer
that the Appellants had knifed Yanes (T. 210). An appointrnent for the next morning was made between the two, the
result of which was (for the first time)Hoopiiana pointed
the finger of blame toward the Appellants (as his bargained-for consideration, in return for p/romises from the
law enforcement agencies: of exoneration for his implication in the death and his flight from the scene to conceal
such; termination of his parole; and his feeling of importance and acceptance by those in authority, who had heretofore chased, caught, convicted and condemned him
throughout his crime-crowded life. (Hoopiiana must have
im1nediately recognized his "take" to be in excess of the
paltry, proverbial 30 pieces of silver. God's mills turn
slowly. But not His people.)
Other pertinent facts shall be referred to as they become applicable to the points of law hereinafter discussed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PREJUDICIAL ERROR RESULTED IN DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY OMISSION OF ELEMENT OF INTENT FROM VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The trial court's given Instruction No. 11, to which the
appellant excepted (T. 287), stated the necessary elements
to be proved for a guilty verdict of voluntary manslaughter, an included offense charged. In short effect, those
elements are listed below:
1.

0

•

0

defendants killed the deceased .

20 ... killing was unlawful ...
3. . . . killing was voluntary upon a sudden

quarrel or in the heat of passion ...
4.... killing. was without malice ...

Voluntary 1\fanslaughter is defined in 76-30-5, U.C.A.,
1B5:3, as being the unlawful killing of a human being without malice upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat o~ passion.
This statutory definition is but declaratory of the common law. At common law, to constitute voluntary manslaughter the killing must be willful or intentional, or there
must exist an intention at least to do great bodily harm.·
The intention may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon or from other and additional evidence. (29 C. J.
1128. Sec. 116, and cases cited; 13 R.C.L. 785, Sec. 90, and
cases cited. May be inferred or not, intent must be an element to be present before guilt.
Our statute was copied frorp California, where it has
heen held that in order to constitute voluntary manslaughter, the intent to kill n~rust exist. (People v. Miller, 114 Cal.
App. 293, 299 Po 742.) In construing an identical statute,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that an intent to kill
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\\-as a

necessary element of voluntary manslaughter.
(Harding v. State, 26 Ariz. 334, 225 P.482.)

This court held in State v. Cobo, 90 U. 89, 60 P.2d 952,
cited in 26 Am. Jur. 167, fn. 11 and in 44 Words and
[Jhrases 412, that the omission. from the instruction on voluntary rnanslaughter that the killing must have been willful or intentional, or that death must have been the result
of willful and intentional infliction of great bodily harm,
amounted to prejudical error, notwithstanding the definition in another instruction of voluntary manslaughter as
the intentional killing upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passion, and notwithstanding the failure of counsel to
E;xcept thereto.
Although, relative to the failure to except (or request),
the rule of the Cobo Case, supra, has become more stringent, (State v. Mitchell, 3 U. 2d 70, 278 P.2d 621, (8)) its
requirement that the killing be intentional remains firm.
(State v. Trujillo, ____ U. ____ 214 P.2d 634 (8); (State v. Jensen, ____ U. ____ ; 236 P.2d 448 (8) ). And it is supported by the
great weight of authority, e.g.:

Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42, 155 S.W. 2d 713; State
v. Clark, Mo. Sup., 111 S.W. 2d 101; State v. Carter,
345 Mo. 74, 131 S.W. 2d 546; Comm. v. Lisou;ski,
274 Pa. 222, 117A. 794; Comm. v. Guida, 208 Pa.
370, 148A. 501; State v. Heinz, 223 Iowa 1241, 275
N.M. 10, 114A. L. R. 959; Mixon v. State, in 7 Ga.
App. 805, 68 S.W. 315; Hawpe v. Comm., 234 Ky. 7,
27 S.W.2d 394; Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 So.
425; Ketring v. State, in 209 Ind. 618, 200 N.E. 212;
State v. Pond, 125 Me. 453, 139A_. 572; United States
v. King, 34 F. 302, 309; State v. CrawfoTd, 66 W.Va.
114, 66 S.E. 110; I Wharton's Criminal Law and
Procedure 580-583, citing many cases.
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The trial court's given Instruction No. 12 states that
the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary, natural and probably consequences of his voluntary acts, though
no definition of the word voluntary appears anywhere
throughout the instructions.
By that, are we to presume a necessary element
(intent to kill) without proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
Hardly! All presumptions, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, not guilt. Evidence is necessary to
prove intent et al elements of a crime. And the jury may
infer ... not not presume ...
Or, are we led to presume that the words voluntary
and intentional or willful are synonomous? Precisely not!
Neither are the words presumption and inference
synonomous.
Moreover, notwithstanding presumptions, infere~ces,
etc., the intent to kill remains a necessary element for voluntary manslaughter. Instruction No. 11 fails to so include
it; instead, the element voluntary stands alone with respect
volition. This will not suffice.
In eve·ry cri1ne, there must be an act and intent or
criminal negligence. Involuntary manslaughter applies
to the criminal negligence aspect of this fundamental law.
But voluntary manslaughter requires the application of
intent. The matter, really. is that elementary.

Intent. being son1ewhat syonomous with willful and
designed. does not mean merely voluntary with respect to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
voluntary n1anslaughter. It means more. In a penal sense it
rneans with a bad purpose (JJ;Jiller v. State, 3 Okla. Cr. 575,
102 P. 948), a free exercise of the will, done by design and
v1ith a purpose. (Murphy v. State, 31 Ind. 511, 513.) It
1neans something more of determination to execute one's
own will in spite and defiance of the law than voluntary.
(State v. Alexander, S.C., 14 Rich. Law, 247, 254.) Malice
aforethought necessarily includes the idea that rnurder was
D result of the voluntary act of the defendant. (Vernon's
Ann. C.C.P., Art. 410; Crutchfield v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. R.
420, 10 s.w. 2d 119, 120.)
"H' illfully means something more than a voluntary act,
and more than an intentional act done with a wrongful
purpose, or with a design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wantoness or lawfulness. (People v. Gillies,

109 N.Y.S. 945, 946; 57 Misc. 568.)
Voluntary manslaughter is committed suddenly (30 sec-

onds: T. 190) and repels the supposition that it is the result
of premeditation or a prearanged plan to kill, but necessarily involves the intention to deprive another of life. The design to kill is a distinguishing characteristic of voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter ..A.lthough, of course, the act
resulting ini death must have been voluntary, the death
itself must have been willful and intentional for voluntary
rnanslaughter (1 Wharton's Crin1inal Law and Procedure
582, 583.) '
An essential of voluntary manslaughter is a willful
and intentional killing, or the willful and intentional inflict ion of great bodily harm resulting in death. As is seen, the
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court's given Instruction No. 11 wholly eliminated that
essential and dominant element of voluntary manslaughter. (Cobo case, et al, supra.)
True, intent may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon or (knife). In the court's given Instruction No. 11,
the lower court spoke of a voluntary killing (not voluntary
act of use of knife) but made no statement of what intent,
as to injury to the victim or death to the victim, might be
inferred from the use of that deadly weapon. There is danger in such an instruction. It tends ot lead the jury to believe that an intention to kill, as distinguished from an
intention to do great bodily harm, of necessity, places the
offense in the class of first degree murder, rather than
n1anslaughter. (State v. Trujillo, ____ U. ____ 214 P.2d 634)
In the instant case, Yanes was killed voluntarily (T.
182) upon a sudden (T. 180, 181) quarrel (T. 182 . . .
··Hello, Raul," ... in an angry voice.) or in the heat of
passion (T. 183 ... scuffle ... ) with provocation such as
would give rise to irresistible passion in the mind of a
reasonable man. (State v. Calton, 5 U.451, 459, 16 P. 902,
rev'd. on another point in 130 U.S. 83, 32 L.#d. 870, 9 S. Ct.
435) as we consider the beatings (T. 90, 91), fights (T.111)
and guarrels (T. 111). The trial court thought same to be
a jury question, or it would not have instructed on voluntary manslaughter (as it did not on involuntary manslaughter.)
Had the jury been properly instructed concerning the
intent ... the verdict might well have been less than murder in the second degree-reduced to at least voluntary ·
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n1anslaughter-or even all the way to not guilty-had
the state been put to its proper burden of proof requiring
an intent to kill rather than a mere voluntary act, which
could be simple or gross negligence ... anything short of
total loss of self control, really.
In circumstances where the court's instructions might
lead to different results, the instructions are inherently
defective and erroneous (State v. Waid, ____ .U. ____ , 67 P.2d
652) and constitute prejudicial error, dictating reversal of
the judgment of the lower court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELl.ANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUC'TION NO. 1 ON DEFINITION OF KINDS OF EVIDENCE.

Mike Hoopiiana testified that he was an eye witness
to the stabbin'g of the deceased (T. 182).
None of the other nineteen witnesses for the state,
nor any of the seven witnesses for the Appellants, testifified directly of his own personal perception of any of the
main facts to be proved.
It might be conceived that some of the testimony o~
Hoopiiana could be classified as being direct evidence;
\Vhile, all other testimony and exhibits would be circumstantial evidence, from which the ultimate facts in dispute
must be inferred if proved.
The above distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is sometimes drawn; however, in a more
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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realistic sense, no evidence is admissible in a court of justice that does not depend more or less on circumstances
for credit. (I Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11, 12 and 13,
fn. 19, citing (CO?nm. v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269.)
It is elementary that the jury is the trier of facts,
v;hich makes it apparent that it must deliberate on evidence. Consequently, for the jury to deliberate in a fair
and meaningful manner to insure constitutional safeguards
to those standing trial for their very lives for first degree
n1urder, the trial court has the duty to instruct adequately
the jury on the law applicable to the particular fact situation being tried and the required manner in which the jury
ntust so conduct itself.
Necessarily, the court must instruct the jury with legal
definitions of terms used, which includes the term evidence,
and supply the jury (for its deliberation) with a ("Mapp
to") guide for the application of those terms.
Notwithstanding that many of the trial court's instructions included such terms as evidence, ci.rcumstances,
facts, inferences, presu1nptions and combinations of those
et al, not only did the trial court fail to give the Appellants'
Requested Instruction No. 1, which defined evidence and
supported the Appellants' theory of defense, but also, the
trial court failed to instruct at all with respect to this basically required principle of the law. Appellants' Requested
Instruction No. 1 read:
I~STRUCTION

NO. 1

You are instructed that evidence is of two
kinds: direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where a witness testifies of his own personal knowledge of the main fact or facts to be proved. Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circums~ances in a certain case, from which the jury
may Infer other and connected facts which usually
and naturally follow according to the common experience of mankind.
Circumstantial evidence is competent, and may
be regarded by the jury in all cases. It should have
its just and fair weight with you. You are not to
fancy situations or circumstances which do not appear in the evidence. You are to make only those
just and resonable inferences from the circun1stances proved which the guarded judgment of a
reasonable man would ordinarily make under like
circumstances.
If, in connection with the other evidence before
you, you have no reasonable doubt as to the defendants' guilt or the guilt of either defendant, you
should convict them or him, whichever your deliberations dictate. But, if you entertain a reasonable
doubt, you should acquit them or him, whichever
your deliberations dictate.
To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to establish the guilt of
the accused must be proved by competent evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. And the facts and circumstances proved must not only be consistent with
the the guilt of the accused, but they must be inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis or
conclusion than that of guilt to product a moral
certainty that the defendants, or either of them,
committed the offense. If the facts of the case can
be reasonably explained in a manner tending to establish innocence, even' though they can be reasonably explained in a manner tending to establish
guilt, then you must, as a matter of law, find the
defendants' or either of them, not guilty. (3 vVharton's Criminal Evidence, 473-477).
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Without the jury having adequate instruction from the
trial court, how are the Appellants assured of their constitutional rights to due process to a fair and in1partial trial
hy jury? Impossible! Without a common framework within
which to function, there humanly results twelve scattered,
~~elf-satisfied minds (con~)fuRed together in their attempt to
determine the fate of the accused. Russian Roulette!
Let us for a moment illustrate just how very much of
even Hoopiiana's testimony is of the nature of circu'lnstantial evidence, rather than direct, as first impression would
dictate, in an effort to show the need for such as the requested instruction to help the jury to decide what weight
should be given different kinds of evidence, pres1tmpt'ions,
inferences, facts, circ,wrnsta,nces, etc.
Does any of the following excerpts from the testimony
of Hoopiiana indicate that he is testifying directly of his
ov;n preception as to the main facts to be proved? Of course
not! ~lost of his conclusions are based on other circumstances or inferred from the facts not ultimate themselves
to \\~arrant proof of required elements .
. . . running footsteps fron1 behind (T. 180, 181) ...
smneone ... (at the time I thought to be Ray) had
a knife and told me to stay out of it (T. 181) ...
. . . Another boy (T. 182) ... at the time I didn't
see his face (T. 183) ... just a hat (T. 190), a derby
(T. 206); not the only one Ted ever wore (T. 241);
\\·as wearing that very night at the El Prado
Bar (T. 238); was wearing when he surrendered
himself to the officers (T. 231); \vas taken as evidence (T. 231); was shown to me by the prosecuting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attorney to identify; not the one I saw the night of
the stabbing (T. 190); was attempting to be suppressed (T. 241), but was finally admitted (T.
242, to save the prosecutor being called as a
witness to prove right the very matter which he
was so adamently resisting (T. 241, 242) ...
. . . I thought it Ted ... said, "Hello, Raul," in an
angry voice, scuffled and stabbed him in the heart
(T. 182) ...
. . . I see the knife go into Raul's chest, I thought,
three times... (T. 189)
. . . didn't see how the scuffle started . . . lasted
about 30 seconds ... around the corner (T. 189)
. . . not too sure . . . pretty scared . . . didn't see
what he did with the knife at all (T. 183) . . .
. . . was drunk (T. 191-fifth of bourbon) .. .
. . . was just looking at four or five knives
kept my eyes on them all the time (T. 184) .. .
. . . not very good look ... took one glance ... that's
all ... eyes on knives only (T. 189) ...

. . . don't know how many guys were there for sure
as I moved sideways to creep out of there so as it
wouldn't excite anybody, you know . . . kind of
turned and walked slowly away, and then I looked
over my shoulder, and they was standing there,
about four or five guys standing around Raul. Then
I went up to the Annex Bar . . . went in ... stayed
not more than a minute and a half or two minutes
... then walked out the door and down the street
(T. 184) ... Raul was laying on his back ... those
two guys that walked out (of the Annex) was looking at him at that time. I walked by and looked at
him (appeared dead . . . yes, sir) ( T. 185) ... I was
positive he was dead (T. 184) ... I got into my car
and went home. (T. 185, 192, 193, 204, 205.)
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Note Carefully! Last question and answer or cross
examination (T. 192):
Q: Isn't it a fact, Mr. Hoopiiana, that rather than your leaving then and going home,
that you, in fact, went to the Blackhawk
Lounge for the purpose of establishing an alibi
if you were asked your whereabout that night?

A. Uhm huh. I went out to the Blackhawk
for a few minutes, yes.
Q: That is all .

. . . didn't volunteer any information at all ... kept
rny mouth shut . . . I figured somebody else had
seen it (T. 197) . . . I was positive he was dead
(T. 204) ... \vhy should I get implicated if I didn't
have to? (T. 197)
After all, Yanes was Hoopiana's friend (T. 204),
whom he left-positively dead on the sidewalkand just drove a\vay-into the night to establish an
alibi. (T. 192).
Why, of course, no need to get implicateduntil have to. t ... I figured somebody else had seen
it (T. 197) ... I could be charged with murder (T.
_______ )

... I thought afterwards if anyone had asked me I
\Vould say I was either at the Blackhawk or at
home because no one knew where I was. (T. 193)
... I knew the barmaid at the Annex and had
leaved to her (T. 207) . . . while I got my mind
straight (T. 204) ... to leave his posjtively dead
friend to go to the Blackhawk to establish an alibi
tT. 192) ...
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. . . before alone causing Ted and Ray to get implicated because of statements to police and prosecutor for a price: parole termination and not being
implicated (charged with murder, as advised by
counsel-(T. 196) . . . and receiving the promise
. . . that the well bargained for information
would be kept a secret for as long as pos1'Jible, (T. 203) and no testimony to be given
unless absolutely necessary (T. 202) . . . and
when it became necessary at the preliminary hearing, first time was purposely out of the county to
avoid testifying (T. 187) and second time, bargained
for no greater charge than second degree murder
against Ted and Ray before testifying, (T. 214),
even after being taken into custody to assure appearance. (T. 187)
Death penalties stir the worst blemished consciences, pronouncedly, when in conflict with doubt
or truth.
It is within the province of the jury to disbelieve eye
tvitnesses and base its conclusions on the inferences to be
drawn from circumstances. (People v. Collins, 117 Cal.,
App. 2d 175, 255· P.2d 59).
Circumstantial evidence is admissable although direct
evidence on the same point is also admitted. (Silverfork v.
lJnited States, 40 A.2d 82, Off'd 80 App. D.C. 158, 151
F'.2d 11).
The jury should have been so instructed in the instant
case. To leave the jury floundering without judicial guidance in a court of law is decidedly prejudicial error to the
Appellants.
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POINT III
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERRED COLLECTIVELY SUF
FICIENT TO DENY APPELLANTS DUE PROCESS OF
LAW IN GIVING ORAL INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT
WAIVER; IMPROPER WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 9, 12, 16, 18 AND 20; AND IN IMPROPER RULINGS PREJUDICIALLY HARMFUL TO APPELLANTS.

A-Oral Instructions:
The trial judge completed reading to the jury the
\Vritten instructions given (T. 280); then he went forward
to further instruct the jury orally (T. 281, 282) without
stipulation or waiver, but on the contrary with appellants
excepting thereto (T. 282), \vhen he told them to deliberate
until 7:00 p.m. before eating (T. 282) and to return a verdict ... (T. 281).
The court returned the jury in an attempt to cure
the error. (T. 284)
Further oral instructions were given without stipulation or waiver with reference to the possible "hung jury"
(T. 289): however, no effort was made to leave the jury
:tnrestricted in time for eating or deliberating.
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil P:roced'ltre, which in the
in~tant matter are surely equally applicable to the trial
of a criminal matter such as the one now before this court
provides that all instruct-ions to the jury shall be 1vritten
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be
g;\·en orally. or otherwise \Vaive this requirement. (Manc.~~tory!)
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The court instructs the jury on the law (77-31-31,
U.S.A., 1953) it is to hear (77-31-32, U.C.A., 1953), and the
written instructions given may be taken to the jury room
(77-32-2, U.C.A., 1953).

B. Prejudicial Rulings:
The appellants moved for a dismissal of the information at a time prior to the formal resting by the state,
while awaiting the arrival of the state's last witness, with
the full understanding that such motion was to have the
same force and effect as if made following the state having
rested. (T. 199).
'l'he trial court denied the motion. (T. 200).
The appellants incorporated the same grounds and reasons in their similar motion which was stipulated and approved to be of effect after the defense had rested. (T. 200).
Likewise, the trial court denied that motion (T. 200) .
.It is contended by appellants that the trial court
should have taken the respective motions under advisen1ent, to rule thereon after all the appropriate evidence
has been admitted. Otherwise, prejudice is impliedly projected against the appellants as a foregone conclusion, necessitating a reversal of that trial court's judgment which
was adverse to the appellants.
It is impossible for the court to lay down the law to
the jury on the facts (77-31-31, U.C.A., 1953) until the
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court has heard the facts. By analogy, the court cannot
lay down the law to the appellants until it has heard the
facts.
C. Given Instruction No. 9:
Given Instruction No. 9 was excepted to as being
in acordance with State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P.2d
1003, re: specific intent to do great bodily harm, but not
in full accord with State v. Thontpson, 110 U. 113, 170 P.2d
153, and State v. Trujillo, ____ U. ____ , 214 P.2d 626.
Both the Thompson and Trujillo cases are in accord
with the Russell Case, supra, to the extent of " ... intention or design knowing the reasonable and natural consequences that would likely cause great bodily injury"
Lut both cases immediately following the word "injury,."
insert the additional element by adding the words "or
death," i.e. ". . . likely cause great bodily injury or
death ... "

The court's instruction was prejudicial in this aspect.
I!. compelled the jury to find the appellants guilty or
second degree murder because of their intending injury
\\·ithout death (receiving a sentence of 10 years to life)
rather than guilty of the lesser included offense voluntary
Illanslaughter, because the court's instructions No. 11 required a voluntary death (whereby they would have reeeiYed a sentence of but 1 to 10 years).
D-Given Instruction No. 12:
Given instruction No. 12 was excepted to as Lcing
too restrittive in that it in1plies that every accused \Vho
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has violently assailed another with a dangerous weapon
in a .manner likely to cause death ... is presumed to have
intended to kill or do great bodily harm.
Note how the court's given Instruction No. 12 includes
the added element (or kill) for second degree murder as
it confusingly conflicts with the court's given Instruction
I\o. 9 as to the elements of second degree (injury only). Abstractly, the discussed part of the court's given Instruction
No. 12 is not to be challenged. However, it does not apply
to the facts and other instructions of the case, e.g. intended
to kill or do great bodily injury as compared with voluntarily killed (no mention of bodily injury).
Nor does -~he court's given Instruction No. 12 provide
a definit~on f9r. the jury of the word "assailed," thereby leaving to. the lay jury no possibility of justifiable or
excuseable .homicide in any conceivable manner.
E. Given Instruction No. 15:
·Given Instruction No. 15 was excepted to as being
prejudicial to at least Ray in that there is no evidence to
warrant the jury considering him as "aiding" ("assisting")
or "abetting" ("encouraging," "advising," or "instigating").
At worst, he held Hoopiiana at the point of a knife
to cause Hoopiiana to "stay out" of the scuffle. This
amounts to "prevention," not "participation." Wherein is
there shown in the entire trial any facts sufficient to warrant such an insinuating instruction. (Surely not just because Ray and Jerome had encountered Albo and the
El Prada earlier the sa1ne night . . . and were seen later
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with Ted walking in a southerly direction! True, the An-

nex Bar is to the south of the El Prado-quite a few blocks.
It is also east. But there are many places to the south of
El Prado, pray tell.
F. Given Instruction No. 16:
Given Instruction No. 16 was excepted to as being
prejudicial because of its making mention of the word "defendant'' (singular) in this joint trial of "defendants"
(plural), and conflicted with given Instruction No. 3,
\vhich instructs only in a manner when the word "defendant=-'" (plural) is used. (State v. \Vaid, supra.)
G. Given Instruction No. 18:
Given Instruction No. 18 was excepted to as being
prejudicial in that it improperly states that the word "willful' is synonymous with the word "intentional," both
in1plying "sin1ply'' a purpose or willingness to com1nit the
act.
Such is not the law as the words are used in the penal
sense.
··\Vilful'' requires a stronger de3ire than "intentional,'' and "intentional" requires a stronger desire than
··voluntary" which, likewise, should have been defined
specifically before the use of the word be permitted to be
used in given Instruction No. 12 to in1ply its being synonymous ,,·ith "intentional." (See 44 \·V ords and Phrases
page 412 and cases cited in Point I, supra.)
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H. Given Instruction No. 20:
Given Instruction No. 20 was excepted to as being
prejudicial against the appellants because of the categorical denunciation of the physical retaliation because of receiving a former injury .
.A.s is obvious throughout the entire trial of the case,

the state insinuated a motive of cold-blooded execution
in retaliation for Ted having been beaten near to the point
of death himself by another at Liberty Park the week before, wherein the deceased had participated.
So had Albo, Far more than Yanes! Had revenge by
death been the motive, why was Albo spared earlier the
same evening? (T. 111)
The instruction emphasizes "retaliation" and "former
injuries," and though subtly includes "revenging," still
leaves the lay juror with no choice for "excusable" or "justifiable" homicide, some of which include "retaliation" in
"revenging" ... a "former injury."
The court prejudicially emphasized that, because of a
reason to be human and not Godly enough to forgive after
having been brutally beaten with ball bats, stomped, kicked
and left to die, Ted and Ray necessarily had a motive to
kill Yanes-because Yanes is dead, and reliable (?) Hoopiiana said so. (The same Hoopiiana who said he had given
Yanes a ride to the Annex Bar-when he was already there
at 11:00 p.m. (State's witness Martinez: T. 164) and 12:00
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midnight (Defense witness Arenez: T. 244) just minutes
before he ~as killed and those two guys .that walked out
of Annex (T. 184) were looking at him.) Why were not
Albo et al killed? Why were they not prosecuted for assault
\\'ith deadly weapons?
All initial injuries become for·mer to their provocatb/e

successors. See homicides without penalty or fault '\vherein
defilement of wife et al are at issue, wherein there has been
no reasonable time for a sufficient cooling of passions, selfdefenses, etc. And it shall be seen that the instruction is
too pointedly directed "toward Liberty Park," without consideration for acceptable alternative routes of travel, other
than those discreetly recommended by the state in its road
sign instructions of one way travel for the jury to join the
prosecution for their synchronized arrival at the preordained point of destruction in the vehicle of immunity because of soverignty-with further assurance of no need for
insurance. By our "guest"!
Be our "guests"! ... until judicially appealing enough
at the junction of justice to compel us to put 'er in RE\;-ERSE.
CONCLUSION
::~
t:>
~·

The defendants haYe been denied due process of la'\v
\vhich is guaranteed by our State and Federal Constitutions and Statutes. They have been deprived of a fair
trial before an impartial jury. Their conviction is not sus-

~~
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tained by the evidence. The trial and verdict constitute a
miscarriage of justice antl should be reversed.
PHIL L. HANSEN
410 Empire Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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